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407 
Note 
Striking a Balance: 
Revising USDA Regulations to Promote 
Competition Without Stifling Innovation 
Amanda Welters* 
Genetically modified organisms. For some, these words 
may conjure images of Frankenstein and wild-haired scientists 
modifying living things with reckless abandon.1 For others, the 
image is of teams of scientists synthesizing forward-thinking 
science in an attempt to enhance an organism’s potential.   
These scientists have changed the world of agriculture as 
crops—like soybeans—are modified for improved performance. 
In 2014, the agriculture industry will be facing for the first 
time the expiration of a patent for an enormously popular 
crop—Roundup Ready soybeans. “While the pharmaceutical in-
dustry has the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 to tell its players 
exactly how to transition seamlessly from patent monopolies to 
generic competition, agricultural biotech has no equivalent.”2 
In 2010, 93 percent of soybeans planted in the United 
                                                          
© 2012 Amanda Welters 
* Law student at the University of Minnesota Law School. The author would 
like to give a big thank you to her dad, Roger Olson, as he was the original in-
spiration for this Note. The author would also like to give many thanks to Pro-
fessor Ralph Hall for his guidance throughout the writing process. 
1. See, e.g., Yann Devos et al., Ethics in the Societal Debate on Genetically 
Modified Organisms: (Re)Quest for Sense and Sensibility, 21 J. AGRIC. & 
ENVTL. ETHICS 29, 33 (2008), available at http://www.springerlink.com/content 
/h8322712ng142735/fulltext.pdf. 
 2. Roger Parloff, Monsanto’s Seeds of Discord: Full Version, FORTUNE 
500 (May 11, 2010, 2:31 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/05/06/news/comp 
anies/monsanto_patent_full.fortune/index.htm. But see Andrew A. Caffrey, III 
& Jonathan M. Rotter, Consumer Protection, Patents and Procedure: Generic 
Drug Market Entry and the Need to Reform the Hatch-Waxman Act, 9 VA J. L. 
& TECH. 1, 28 (2004) (illustrating that the transition to generics in the phar-
maceutical industry was not so “seamless” with an FTC study that showed the 
Hatch-Waxman Act resulted in increased litigation and extended patent 
stays). 
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States were herbicide-resistant.3 This percentage is largely at-
tributable to one company—Monsanto—with its Roundup 
Ready (RR) soybeans.4 Since Monsanto first introduced its RR 
soybean in 1996,5 the company has enjoyed a strong hold on the 
soybean market.6 Monsanto’s patent on the RR technology ex-
pires in 2014, which will enable companies to begin manufac-
turing a generic version of the RR soybean.7 Current legisla-
tion, however, cannot adequately oversee the transition to the 
generic use of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). The 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) is responsible 
for overseeing the regulation of GMOs—like RR soybeans.8 Re-
cent court cases questioning the USDA’s effectiveness in over-
seeing name brand GMOs raises concerns over the USDA’s 
ability to monitor generic GMOs.9 Moreover, legislation is 
needed to ensure the availability of generic GMOs as name 
brand manufacturers like Monsanto attempt to use patent pro-
tections to slow the emergence of generic versions.10 
                                                          
 3. NAT’L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERVICES, AGRIC. STAT. BOARD, ACREAGE 25 
(2010), available at http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/usda/current/Acre/Acre-06-
30-2010.pdf. 
 4. Alison Fitzgerald, Monsanto 7-State Probe Threatens Profit from 93% 
Soybean Share, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 10, 2010, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aCK4Q3XZCpy. 
 5. Jennifer M. Latzke, Roundup Ready Soybean Trait Nears Expiration 
in 2014, HIGH PLAINS/MIDWEST AG J., at 1 (Aug. 2, 2010), available at 
http://www.hpj.com/archives/2010/aug10/aug2/0716SeedMACOAug2sr.cfm. 
 6. See Monsanto, the Government, Monopoly Claims, MONSANTO, 
http://www.monsanto.com/food-inc/Pages/monsanto-revolving-door.aspx (last 
visited Aug. 28, 2011) (recognizing that the majority of soybeans planted con-
tain the Roundup Ready gene); see also Jack Kaskey, Monsanto’s Roundup 
Ready Soybeans Probed by Justice (Update4), BLOOMBERG (Jan. 14, 2010, 5:09 
PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a.17Be 
OtaDpU (examining the U.S. Justice Department’s probe into possible anti-
competitive practices by Monsanto). 
 7. Kaskey, supra note 6. 
 8. See Frequently Asked Questions About Biotechnology, U.S. DEPT. OF 
AGRIC., http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?contentid=Biotech 
nologyFAQs.xml&navid=AGRICULTURE (last visited Sept. 9, 2011) [herein-
after USDA FAQs]. 
 9. See Jack Kaskey, Monsanto Won’t Block Generic Seeds as Patents End 
(Update3), BLOOMBERG (Jan. 11, 2010, 4:40 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aU3lBepsCb68 [hereinafter Monsanto Won’t 
Block Generic Seeds]; see also Parloff, supra note 2 (discussing Monsanto com-
petitor Dupont’s claims that “Monsanto is using abusive patent license provi-
sions”). 
 10. Monsanto Won’t Block Generic Seeds, supra note 9. 
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This Note outlines current issues surrounding the regula-
tion of generic GMOs and proposes changes to existing USDA 
regulations. Part I provides an overview of the current regula-
tory issues and patent protections used in the agriculture in-
dustry that impact the availability of generic GMOs. Part II 
briefly compares the agriculture industry to the pharmaceutical 
industry and then contemplates how the pharmaceutical indus-
try may be instructive in establishing USDA regulations that 
are more effective while ensuring an efficient transition to the 
use of generic GMOs. This Note concludes that the USDA 
should adopt a regulation similar to the Hatch-Waxman Act to 
facilitate the entrance of generic GMOs in the market. 
I.  OVERVIEW OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED 
ORGANISMS, REGULATIONS, AND PATENT 
PROTECTIONS 
A. GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS 
A genetically modified organism is an “organism where the 
genetic material is altered unnaturally through fertilization 
and/or recombination.”11 An organism’s genetic material is typ-
ically altered to confer some benefit—usually economic in na-
ture.12 One variation of a GMO is genetically engineered crops, 
which are engineered to provide various benefits to farmers 
ranging from weed and insect resistance to enhanced drought 
tolerance.13 Monsanto’s RR soybeans are a genetically engi-
neered crop because the company has modified the soybean to 
build a tolerance to glyphosate.14 Glyphosate is an active ingre-
                                                          
 11. Debdatta Dobe & Rohini Sen, Genetically Modified Organisms Trade 
Route and Biosafety—Is it a Failing Synthesis?, 1 AM. J. OF ECON. & BUS. 
ADMIN. 206, 206 (2009), available at http://thescipub.com/html/ 
10.3844/ajebasp.2009.206.212. 
 12. See Genetically Modified Food: What are Genetically Modified Foods?, 
NAT. HEALTH GUIDE, http://www.natural-health-guide.com/genetically-
modified-food.html, (last visited Aug. 28, 2011). 
 13. See USDA FAQs, supra note 8. The USDA defines genetic engineering 
as the “[m]anipulation of an organism’s genes using the methods of modern 
molecular biology.” Biotechnology: Glossary of Agricultural Biotechnology 
Terms, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usda 
home?contentid=BiotechnologyGlosary.xml&navid=AGRICULTURE (last vis-
ited Sept. 11, 2011). 
 14. Safety Assessment of Roundup Ready Soybean Event 40-3-2, 
MONSANTO (Sept. 2002), http://www.monsanto.com/products/Documents/safety 
-summaries/soybean_es.pdf [hereinafter Safety Assessment]. 
10 WELTERS FINAL_JAD (DO NOT DELETE) 2/28/2012 12:38 PM 
410 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 13:1 
 
 
dient in Monsanto’s Roundup herbicides.15 By engineering the 
soybean to have a tolerance to glyphosate, farmers are able to 
spray fields with Monsanto’s herbicides without killing the soy-
beans.16 Moreover, the Roundup herbicide is effective against 
several types of weeds and grasses, which allow the farmers to 
spray less often.17 Since farmers do not need to spray as often, 
Roundup herbicides enable farmers to save money on fertilizer, 
implement effective weed management programs, and be more 
environmentally friendly.18 
B. THE GREAT DEBATE: DO THE BENEFITS OF GMOS OUTWEIGH 
THE RISKS? 
In addition to the various benefits attributed to Monsanto’s 
RR soybeans, there are also several concerns about their use.19 
One concern is that RR soybeans build herbicide resistance in 
weeds.20 Studies have shown that weed resistance to glypho-
sate has increased since the introduction of RR crops.21 If the 
weeds are less resistant to the Roundup herbicide, more herbi-
cide is required to effectively eradicate the weeds; thus, remov-
ing some of the benefits associated with the use of RR soy-
beans.22 
The controversy surrounding the use of RR soybeans is just 
one example of the larger debate regarding the use of GMOs in 
general.23 The various advantages of GMOs that proponents 
point to include: drought tolerance, disease resistance, and pest 
                                                          
 15. Id. 
 16. See Barry A. Palevitz, DNA Surprise: Monsanto Discovers Extra Se-
quences in its Roundup Ready Soybeans, 14 THE SCIENTIST 20 (2000), availa-
ble at http://classic.the-scientist.com/article/display/11963. 
 17. Safety Assessment, supra note 14. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See Deborah Whitman, Genetically Modified Foods: Harmful or Help-
ful, CSA DISCOVERY GUIDES, at 5 (Apr. 2000), http://www.csa.com/discovery 
guides/gmfood/review.pdf. 
 20. Id. at 6. 
 21. Terrance Hurley et al., Effects of Weed-Resistance Concerns and Re-
sistance-Management Practices on the Value of Roundup Ready Crops, 12 J. 
AGROBIOTECH. MGMT. & ECON. 291, 291 (2009), available at 
http://www.agbioforum.org/v12n34/v12n34a05-mitchell.pdf. 
 22. See Monsanto and the Roundup Ready Controversy, 
SOURCEWATCH.ORG, http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Monsanto 
_and_the_Roundup_Ready_Controversy (last modified May 13, 2010, 12:30 
AM). 
 23. Whitman, supra note 19, at 1. 
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resistance.24 GMOs may also improve nutrition, especially in 
developing countries. 25 In addition, scientists are beginning to 
modify plants to have pharmaceutical value with the goal of 
making medicine more accessible, especially to those in devel-
oping countries.26 
For all the benefits associated with the use of GMOs, crit-
ics point out that there are also downsides.27 Critics of GMOs 
cannot be easily categorized—ranging from members of reli-
gious organizations and environmental activists to scientists 
and government officials.28 These critics claim the potential 
risks and drawbacks to GMOs outweigh the potential bene-
fits.29 In addition to environmental concerns, such as transfer-
ring genes to unintended species, there are also human health 
risks and economic concerns.30 One persistent health concern is 
that the use of GMOs may create new allergies or that a gene 
introduced in a plant may cause an allergic reaction.31 For ex-
ample, many Americans have an allergy to peanuts. If a scien-
tist introduces a gene from a peanut into soybeans, the gene 
may cause an allergic reaction in an unsuspecting person.32 
One economic concern regarding GMOs is the potential to 
marginalize the poor.33 GMOs require extensive research and 
development before they may be commercialized.34 As a result, 
companies seek protective patents on their products in order to 
recoup their initial investments.35 However, critics worry that 
the protective patents will allow companies to raise prices so 
high that developing countries and smaller farmers will be un-
able to purchase the seeds and benefit from them, “thus widen-
                                                          
 24. Id. at 2–4. 
 25. Id. at 3. For example, some developing countries rely on rice for food, 
but rice by itself contains small amounts of nutritional value. Therefore, if the 
rice can be modified to add vitamins and minerals, it could ameliorate the 
malnutrition problem in some developing countries. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See generally id. (outlining several positive and negative aspects asso-
ciated with the use of GMOs). 
 28. Id. at 5. 
 29. E.g., Genetically Modified Food, supra note 12. 
 30. Whitman, supra note19, at 7–8. 
 31. Id. at 7. 
 32. See, e.g., id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
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ing the gap between the wealthy and the poor.”36 
The debate surrounding the use of GMOs is not limited to 
the United States.37 Countries around the world are divided on 
the use of GMOs.38 The international dispute over GMOs in-
volves issues such as the “technical aspects of GMOs and their 
international impacts” as well as “consumer education related 
to GMOs.” 39 
C. REGULATING GMOS 
1. Food Safety in the United States: A Coordinated Framework 
The U.S. Government places the responsibility of policing 
GMOs with three primary agencies: the Food & Drug Admin-
istration (FDA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 
and the USDA.40 The agency that regulates a specific GMO de-
pends on the intended use of the product.41 The FDA generally 
regulates foods in interstate commerce that are eaten by ani-
mals or humans, such as a bowl of cornflakes.42 Meanwhile, the 
EPA determines the environmental risks of pesticides and ge-
netically engineered plants containing altered pesticide proper-
ties.43 The EPA conducts risk assessments on pesticides that 
pose a potential harm to humans or the environment. There are 
strict guidelines regarding the amount of pesticides that may 
be present while the crop is growing, in addition to the level of 
pesticide retained in the food. Farmers must ensure they are 
                                                          
 36. Id. 
 37. See Dobe & Sen, supra note 11, at 208. 
 38. Id. Countries like Japan, the United Kingdom, and Taiwan are more 
reluctant to use GMOs than the United States. Id. Some of this reluctance 
may stem from mistrust in governmental regulatory oversight for food. See id. 
For example, in the United Kingdom, part of this mistrust arguably arises 
from recent food scares. Sally Eden, et al., The Sceptical Consumer? Exploring 
Views About Food Assurance, 33 FOOD POL’Y 624, 624 (2008). 
 39. Dobe & Sen, supra note 11, at 208. 
 40. USDA FAQs, supra note 13. 
 41. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 
23,302, 23,304 (June 26, 1986) (“Jurisdiction over the varied biotechnology 
products is determined by their use . . . .”); USDA FAQs, supra note 13. 
 42. Whitman, supra note 19 (noting that the FDA regulates cornflakes 
because it is considered a “food product” and not a “whole food”); see also Alan 
McHughen, Plant Genetic Engineering and Regulation in the United States, 
UNIV. OF CAL. DIVISION OF AGRIC. & NAT. RESOURCES, at 3, 
http://ucanr.org/freepubs/docs/8179.pdf (last visited Aug. 28, 2011). 
 43. McHughen, supra note 42, at 3. 
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adhering to the EPA’s safety standards.44  
The USDA—the third agency in the coordinated frame-
work—assesses how safe it is to grow the genetically engi-
neered plant.45 For example, while the FDA regulates corn-
flakes, the USDA regulates the corn that was a raw material in 
producing the cornflakes.46 The USDA monitors for various en-
vironmental problems, such as insects developing resistance to 
certain genetically engineered crops, and conducts studies to 
determine the relative safety of genetically engineered plants, 
animals, and microorganisms.47 Specifically, the USDA’s Ani-
mal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) division is 
responsible for ensuring that U.S. crops are free of pests and 
disease.48 
Monsanto’s Roundup Ready soybeans are regulated by 
both the USDA and the EPA. Soybeans are like corn in that 
they are considered a “whole food,” so the USDA is responsible 
for ensuring that the modified soybean plant is safe to grow 
and will not adversely affect other agriculture and the envi-
ronment.49 The EPA is responsible for assessing whether the 
RR soybean crops are safe to use.50 
2. The Inner-Workings of Current and Proposed USDA 
Regulations 
The USDA derives its regulatory power over GMOs—like 
RR soybeans—from the Plant Protection Act (PPA).51 The PPA 
                                                          
 44. See Whitman, supra note 19, at 10 (“The USDA is concerned with po-
tential hazards of the plant itself. Does it harbor insects? Is it a noxious weed? 
Will it cause harm to indigenous species . . . ?). 
 45. See id. 
 46. See id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. USDA FAQs, supra note 13. 
 49. See McHughen, supra note 42, at 3; Whittman, supra note 19; see, e.g., 
Louise Prance, USDA Grants New Soybean Deregulation, 
FOODNAVIGATOR.COM (Aug. 6, 2007), http://www.foodnavigator-
usa.com/Regulation/USDA-grants-new-soybean-deregulation (noting that the 
USDA regulates Monsanto’s RR soybeans). 
 50. Maggie Delano, Key Players, ROUNDUP READY CROPS, 
http://web.mit.edu/demoscience/Monsanto/players.html (last visited Aug. 28, 
2011). 
 51. Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 7711 (2006). Prior to the enactment of 
the PPA in 2000, APHIS derived its regulatory power from two acts: the Plant 
Quarantine Act (PQA) and the Federal Plant Pest Act (FPPA). Gregory N. 
Mandel, Gaps, Inexperience, Inconsistencies, and Overlaps: Crisis in the Regu-
lation of Genetically Modified Plants and Animals, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
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grants the USDA the authority to “prohibit or restrict . . . any 
plant . . . if [the Secretary of Agriculture] determines that the 
prohibition or restriction is necessary to prevent . . . the dis-
semination of a plant pest or noxious weed within the United 
States.”52 The PPA defines “plant pest” broadly, which results 
in the USDA having the authority to regulate GMOs.53 The 
USDA then delegates to APHIS the task of ensuring compli-
ance with the PPA.54 
The PPA requires developers of a GMO to first evaluate 
the risk of the plant, and then follow either a notification or 
permit process.55 The goal of both processes is to prevent the 
escape of harmful GMOs into the environment.56 The notifica-
tion process, however, is shorter and simpler than the permit 
process.57 
A developer can follow the notification process so long as it 
meets the following six standards: (1) the plant is not a “nox-
ious weed”; (2) the genetic material is “stably integrated”; (3) 
the function of the genetic material is known and will not result 
in plant disease; (4) the genetic material does not cause “pro-
duction of an infection entity,” encode substances that will “be 
toxic to non-target organisms,” or “encode products intended for 
pharmaceutical or industrial use”; (5) plant virus-derived ge-
netic material must be “noncoding regulatory sequences of 
known function, or . . . prevalent and endemic in the area 
where introduction will occur”; and (6) the plant cannot be mod-
ified to contain certain “genetic material[s] from animal or hu-
man pathogens.” 58 
                                                          
2167, 2224 (2004). 
 52. Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 7712(a) (2006). 
 53. See 7 C.F.R. § 340.1 (2010) (defining “plant pests” as “[a]ny living 
stage of . . . invertebrate animals, bacteria, fungi, other parasitic plants . . . or 
any infectious agents or substances, which can directly or indirectly injure or 
cause disease or damage in or to any plants . . . or any processed, manufac-
tured, or other products of plants”). 
 54. See Mandel, supra note 51, at 2224. 
 55. Id. at 2225. 
 56. Id. at 2225–26. 
 57. See id. at 2226. “Nearly 99% of all field tests, importations, and inter-
state movement of genetically engineered plants take place under the notifica-
tion system.” Id. 
 58. 7 C.F.R. § 340.3(b)(1)–(6). If the six standards are met then the devel-
oper needs to only mail notification to APHIS with contact information for the 
developer, identifying information for the “regulated article,” the location of 
where the environmental release will take place, the date of the release, and a 
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If, however, the GMO is unable to meet all six criteria then 
the developer must follow the longer permit process.59 Two ver-
sions of the permit application must be submitted.60 The first 
copy should contain confidential information and trade secrets, 
but those pages containing this information should be marked 
“CBI copy,”61 and the second copy of the application should 
have the confidential information redacted with “CBI deleted” 
on those pages.62 Additionally, developers can ask that their 
genetically engineered plant be granted “nonregulated sta-
tus.”63 The developer must prepare a complete statement sup-
porting why the GMO should be granted non-regulatory sta-
tus.64 Moreover, APHIS must prepare a detailed environmental 
impact statement (EIS) when it takes “major Federal actions 
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.”65 
If the GMO will not have a substantial environmental impact, 
the shorter environmental assessment (EA) suffices.66 Typically 
only one APHIS employee determines whether the notification 
process is sufficient to approve the genetically engineered plant 
without any public or scientific expert comment.67 Further—as 
currently applied—once a plant has been granted non-
regulated status, the plant’s status is “absolute” and the agency 
will not have “further oversight of the plant or its progeny and 
descendants.”68 
APHIS is currently in the process of revising its regula-
tions for GMOs.69 The goal of the revisions is to improve trans-
                                                          
statement certifying that the six standards are met. 7 C.F.R. § 340.3(d). 
 59. 7 C.F.R. § 340.3(e). The permit application must be filed at least 120 
days before the contemplated release of the plant as compared to only 30 days 
under the notification process. 7 C.F.R. § 340.4(b). 
 60. 7 C.F.R. § 340.4(a). 
 61. CBI stands for “confidential business information.” Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. 7 C.F.R. § 340.6(a). 
 64. 7 C.F.R. § 340.6(b). The developer must “include copies of scientific 
literature, copies of unpublished studies . . . and data from tests performed . . . .” 
Id. 
 65. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (2006). 
 66. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.13 (2010). 
 67. COMM. ON ENVTL. IMPACTS ASSOC. WITH COMMERCIALIZATION OF 
TRANSGENIC PLANTS ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF TRANSGENIC 
PLANTS: THE SCOPE AND ADEQUACY OF REGULATION 9 (2002), available at 
http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=10258&page=1. 
 68. Id. at 10. 
 69. See Proposed Revisions to APHIS Regulation of Genetically Engineered 
Organisms, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., http://www.aphis.usda.gov/biotechnology/ 
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parency, eliminate unnecessary regulations, and enhance clari-
ty of regulations.70 Under the proposed regulations, the notifi-
cation process would be removed71 and replaced with three 
types of permits: interstate movement, importation, and envi-
ronmental release.72 Permits for an environmental release 
would include a multiple category system.73 The categories 
would be based on the risk associated with the genetically en-
gineered plant as well as the ability of the unmodified version 
of the plant to survive with the introduction of the modified 
plant.74 The proposed regulations would purportedly clarify the 
process and standard used to determine approval for 
nonregulated status.75 Further, a procedure may be included 
that allows APHIS to revoke nonregulated status.76 Those ge-
netically engineered plants currently non-regulated will be 
grandfathered in and continue to have such status.77 
Changes to the regulations, however, have been slow in 
coming.78 In July 2007, APHIS issued a Draft Environmental 
Issue Statement summarizing the issues APHIS was contem-
plating while making the changes.79 One of the significant 
                                                          
340/340_index.shtml (last modified Mar. 22, 2011) [hereinafter Proposed Revi-
sions to APHIS]. 
 70. See Transcript of a Media Call on the Proposed Regulatory Revisions, 
FTS-USDA-APHIS (Oct. 6, 2008), available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/ 
newsroom/content/2008/10/content/printable/brs_transcript_340_10608.pdf 
[hereinafter Transcript of a Media Call]. 
 71. Questions and Answers: Proposed Revisions to Biotechnology Regula-
tions, USDA-APHIS (Oct. 2008), http://www.aphis.usda.gov/publications/bio 
technology/content/printable_version/faq_brs340.pdf [hereinafter Questions 
and Answers]. 
 72. Martha E. Marrapese, USDA APHIS Proposes Amendments to Regula-
tions Regarding Genetically Engineered Organisms, MARTINDALE.COM (July 
31, 2009), http://www.martindale.com/technology-science-law/article_Keller-
Heckman-LLP_763758.htm. 
 73. Questions and Answers, supra note 71. 
 74. Marrapese, supra note 72. All other genetically engineered organisms 
besides genetically engineered plants “would be placed into a single category 
and reviewed on a case-by-case basis.” Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See Proposed Revisions to APHIS, supra note 69 (showing that chang-
es to the USDA regulations for biotechnology were first considered in 2007, 
but no revisions have been forthcoming since the public comment period ended 
mid-2009). 
 79. Lessons Learned and Revisions Under Consideration APHIS’ Biotech-
nology Framework, USDA 1, http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/content/ 
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changes proposed is replacing the current notification system 
with the previously discussed multi-permit system.80 The pro-
posed revisions were open for public comment on October 9, 
2008 and reopened for public comment on January 16, 2009, 
which was extended until June 29, 2009.81 Since the end of the 
comment period in June 2009, APHIS has not made further 
publications to indicate the strides it is making with the revi-
sions.82 Noticeably absent in USDA regulations, as well as in 
the proposed revisions, is the procedure for regulating generic 
GMOs.83 
3. Current USDA Regulations Leave Much To Be Desired 
 Despite the USDA’s attempts to effectively regulate ge-
netically engineered crops, problems still exist. First, the 
USDA’s current GMO regulations are inadequate for effective 
regulation.84 The PPA only covers those GMOs classified as 
“plant pests.”85 As a result, the PPA does not cover those organ-
isms that are beneficial to plants, nor nonparasitic plants, nor 
vertebrate animals.86 Therefore, many biological species remain 
unregulated, even though environmental risks may exist.87 
Second, recent cases demonstrate that APHIS has not dili-
                                                          
2007/10/content/printable/LessonsLearned10-2007.pdf (last visited Aug. 28, 
2011). The purpose of the Draft Environmental Issue Statement is to assess 
the environmental impact proposed changes would have. Proposed Revisions to 
APHIS, supra note 69. 
 80. See Transcript of a Media Call, supra note 70. 
 81. Proposed Revisions to APHIS, supra note 69. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See Parloff, supra note 2 (noting that there is a “legislative void” in 
transitioning products from patented protection to generic competition). 
 84. William Allen, The Current Federal Regulatory Framework for Release 
of Genetically Altered Organisms into the Environment, 42 FLA. L. REV. 531, 
545 (1990). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. For example, the FDA, rather than the USDA, determines whether 
genetically modified salmon should be approved for human consumption. Kim 
Carollo, Surprise: FDA Panel Unable to Reach Conclusion on Genetically Mod-
ified Salmon, ABC NEWS (Sept. 20, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/ 
Health/WellnessNews/fda-unable-reach-conclusion-genetically-modified-
salmon/story?id=11682586. While the Federal Food and Drug Cosmetic Act 
may be seen as giving the FDA regulatory authority over animals, like salmon, 
its authority has not been clearly established. Guides to U.S. Regulation of 
Genetically Modified Food and Agricultural Biotechnology Products, PEW 
INITIATIVE ON FOOD & BIOTECH. 22, available at http://www.pewtrusts.org 
/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Food_and_Biotechnology/hhs_biotec
h_0901.pdf. 
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gently followed the procedures required by the PPA.88 For ex-
ample, the USDA has failed to prepare an EIS in several in-
stances.89 In 2005, APHIS deregulated RR alfalfa but failed to 
first prepare an EIS, allegedly in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 
4332(2)(c).90 Even though APHIS received over 500 comments 
opposing the deregulation of RR alfalfa and despite APHIS’s 
own internal documents warning that contamination could oc-
cur, APHIS still granted RR alfalfa deregulated status.91 
APHIS again failed to complete an EIS before deregulating 
genetically engineered sugar beets.92 The California District 
Court ruled that APHIS violated the law by not first preparing 
an EIS and prohibited future plantings of genetically engi-
neered sugar beets until an EIS was prepared.93 
C. PREVENTING GENERIC COMPETITION THROUGH GMO 
PATENTS 
Even though Monsanto has announced that it will not im-
pede manufacturers from making a generic version of the RR 
soybean once its patent expires in 2014,94 farmers and Monsan-
to’s competitors still worry that the company will use various 
tactics to prevent the market entrance of a generic version.95 
Some of this fear stems from hard-line tactics Monsanto has 
previously used to protect its RR soybean patents as well as 
from concerns regarding the recent development of its Roundup 
Ready 2 (RR2) soybean. 
                                                          
 88. Deniza Gertsberg, Internal Reports Finds USDA’s Failure to Effective-
ly Regulate GMOs, GMO J. (Jan. 28, 2010), http://gmo-
journal.com/index.php/2010/01/28/internal-report-finds-usdas-failure-to-
effectively-regulate-gmos. A 2005 Inspector General report found that the 
USDA at times was unaware of the specific location where a GMO was to be 
planted; the agency failed to adequately document its reasons for approving 
“initial field test applications” and the agency did not always require a report 
of what was to be done with the GM crops after the trial was complete. Id. 
 89. E.g., Monsanto Co. v. Geerston Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2758 
(2010). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 2762–63 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 92. Center for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 734 F. Supp. 2d 948, 950 (N.D. Cal. 
2010). 
 93. Id. at 952–53. 
 94. Kaskey, supra note 6; see Roundup Ready Soybean Patent Expiration, 
MONSANTO, http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/Pages/roundup-ready-
patent-expiration.aspx (last visited Aug. 28, 2011). 
 95. Kaskey, supra note 6. 
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One significant way Monsanto defends its RR soybean pa-
tent is by prohibiting farmers from saving the seeds of RR soy-
beans. A farmer that purchases RR soybeans is required to sign 
a written document agreeing not to save or replant seeds pro-
duced from a grown RR soybean plant.96 Monsanto’s rationale 
behind the prohibition is that a farmer has not paid for the 
soybeans featuring Monsanto technology if they are grown from 
the saved seeds.97 Accordingly, Monsanto has sued farmers who 
have violated the agreement.98 Farmers meanwhile have criti-
cized Monsanto for employing this tactic.99  
Even though farmers will be able to save and replant seeds 
grown from their own crop once the RR soybean patent expires 
in 2014, farmers still fear that Monsanto’s introduction of the 
RR2 soybean is another tactic the company will use to impede 
the development of a generic version of the soybean.100 It is 
feared that in an effort to induce the market to adopt the RR2 
soybeans, Monsanto could force farmers to begin purchasing 
the new RR2 variety before a generic version of the older RR 
soybean is widely adopted.101 As a result, the generic RR soy-
bean, set to go off patent in 2014, would no longer be as desira-
ble and there would be less incentive for generic manufacturers 
to duplicate the RR soybean.102 
The concerns regarding the forced adoption of a similar 
GMO and aggressive patent protections are just two examples 
of tactics used by companies to protect their patented prod-
ucts.103 Critics believe, however, that these tactics lead to high-
er prices and limit the public’s ability to purchase and benefit 
                                                          
 96. Why Does Monsanto Sue Farmers Who Save Seeds?, MONSANTO, 
http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/Pages/why-does-monsanto-sue-farmers-
who-save-seeds.aspx (last visited Aug. 28, 2011). 
 97. See id. 
 98. Id. Between 1997 and April 2010, Monsanto filed lawsuits against 144 
farmers. Id. 
 99. Monsanto Won’t Block Generic Seeds, supra note 9 (“Farmers criticized 
Monsanto in the 2008 documentary ‘Food Inc.’ for its contracts to keep them 
from saving seeds after a harvest.”). The criticisms have included suing farm-
ers at all for having saved seeds, “suing a small farmer for cleaning seeds,” 
and fear of suing farmers for genetically engineered crops that blew into a 
farmer’s field. Food, Inc. Movie, MONSANTO, http://www.monsanto.com/food-
inc/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Nov. 1, 2011). 
 100. See Monsanto and the Roundup Ready Controversy, supra note 22. 
 101. Michael Stumo, Anticompetitive Tactics in Ag Biotech Could Stifle En-
trance of Generic Traits, 15 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 137, 140–41 (2010). 
 102. See id. at 142. 
 103. See Stumo, supra note 101, at 140−43. 
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from genetically engineered crops.104 
D. THE NEED FOR CHANGE 
The entrance of generics into the market will magnify the 
problems currently seen with respect to GMOs—inadequate 
and ineffective administration of current GMO regulations as 
well as the hard-line patent protection policies used by name 
brand companies.105 The lower prices from the sale of generics 
will likely result in increased demand.106 If demand increases, 
the negative health and environmental effects will be exacer-
bated as more people use GMOs.107 In addition, name brand 
companies will engage in more tactics to protect their patents 
and maintain their market share.108 On the other hand, there 
are various benefits associated with the use of GMOs, and the 
use of generic GMOs will also lead to more people realizing  
                                                          
 104. See Kaskey, supra note 6; see also Whitman, supra note 19, at 7 
(“[C]onsumer advocates are worried that patenting these new plant varieties 
will raise the price of seeds so high that small farmers and third world coun-
tries will not be able to afford seeds from GM crops . . . .”). 
 105. See supra notes 94−104 and accompanying text. 
 106. Cf. Economics Basics: Demand and Supply, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/university/economics/economics3.asp (last visited 
Aug. 28, 2011). The pharmaceutical industry, for example, has seen the effect 
that lower prices have on demand. The decreased pricing associated with ge-
nerics is caused by the influx of generic brands hitting the market after the 
expiration of a patent. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOW INCREASED 
COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN 
THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 28 (1998). As a result, the different competi-
tors try to differentiate themselves by dropping prices to incentivize consum-
ers to purchase their version of a drug. Id. at 32. The manufacturers of generic 
drugs are able to set lower prices because they do not have the initial invest-
ment costs of brand-name manufacturers. Cf. id. at 14–16 (explaining the 
costs incurred by drug manufacturers during new drug development). A Fed-
eral Trade Commission report found that after a pharmaceutical drug’s patent 
expires and two generic companies begin immediately selling a generic version 
of the drug, the price is 6.5% lower on average as compared to only 4.5% lower 
on average if only one generic manufacturer enters the market. Daniel B. 
Moskowitz, FTC: Authorized Generics Lead to Lower Prices, DRUG BENEFIT 
TRENDS (Aug. 1, 2009), http://dbt.consultantlive.com/generics/content/article 
/1145628/1465515. Moreover, even Monsanto recognizes that a benefit of ge-
neric RR soybeans is the increased availability of the technology to the public. 
Roundup Ready Soybean Patent Expiration, supra note 94. 
 107. “Farmers and seed companies, having paid dearly for Roundup 
Ready’s benefits throughout its patent life, are now eager to begin enjoying 
their half of the patent bargain—the point when Monsanto’s legal monopoly 
expires and Roundup Ready enters the public domain.” Parloff, supra note 2. 
 108. Stumo, supra note 101, at 140. 
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these advantages.109 One of the possible advantages of a gener-
ic RR soybean is the possibility that it might address the eco-
nomic concerns of small farmers who are unable to afford ge-
netically engineered crops such as RR soybeans.110 With the 
entrance of generic genetically engineered crops into the mar-
ket and the resulting lower prices, more farmers will be able to 
afford the technology.111 
Given the magnification of advantages that may result 
from the increased availability of generic GMOs, the USDA-
APHIS should revise its regulations to facilitate the market en-
trance of generic GMOs in order to realize the various benefits 
from their use. With any increase in the use of GMOs the dis-
advantages attributed to their use will also be magnified, so 
regulatory oversight of generic GMOs is still necessary in order 
to limit these concerns. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
While the USDA-APHIS is currently revising its regula-
tions for GMOs, we should also consider striking a proper bal-
ance between ensuring that generic GMOs are safe, spurring 
innovation, and promoting competition. To help strike the 
proper balance, the USDA can look to the pharmaceutical in-
dustry and the Hatch-Waxman Act. The Hatch-Waxman Act is 
a useful regulatory structure that supports the entrance of ge-
neric drugs while protecting name brand companies that origi-
nally developed the drugs. In addition, the recently passed 
Biosimilar Act further supports the adoption of an act similar 
to the Hatch-Waxman Act by the agriculture industry. 
A. AN INDUSTRY COMPARISON 
The agriculture industry and pharmaceutical industry are 
similar in various ways. First, both industries require signifi-
cant initial costs in development, either of a genetically engi-
neered crop or a new drug, and then in bringing the new prod-
uct to market. Monsanto has stated that it typically takes an 
                                                          
 109. Whitman, supra note 19, at 2–4 (listing the potential benefits of 
GMOs). If the disadvantages of using generic GMOs are magnified as more 
people gain access to the technology, there should also be an increase in the 
benefits associated with the use of GMOs as well. See generally id. at 7–8 (ex-
plaining that small farmers do not have the financial ability to take advantage 
of GMOs). 
 110. See generally id. at 7–8. 
 111. See id. at 7. 
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average of ten years and $100 million to bring a new product to 
market,112 and the Congressional Budget Office notes that 
pharmaceutical companies can spend more than $800 million to 
develop an innovative pharmaceutical drug.113 Second, each in-
dustry utilizes mergers and acquisitions to reduce costs, aug-
ment product offerings, and increase the number of patents.114 
In the agriculture industry, there has been an upward trend in 
mergers and acquisitions since the late 1990s115 and “by 2002, 
95[%] of patents originally held by seed or small ag-biotech 
firms had been acquired by large chemical or multinational 
corporations.”116 The pharmaceutical industry has also had 
numerous restructurings through mergers and acquisitions re-
sulting in the ten largest companies accounting for approxi-
mately fifty percent of worldwide sales in 2002 as compared to 
only twelve percent in 1987. 
Third, besides using acquisitions to offset the substantial 
investment costs, both industries have utilized various patent 
protections to protect their investments. One of agriculture in-
dustry’s largest firms—Monsanto—has employed patent pro-
                                                          
 112. Jeffrey Tomich, Monsanto Growth Falters as SmartStax Yields, Pric-
ing Raise Questions, STLTODAY.COM (Oct. 6, 2010, 12:05 AM), 
http://www.stltoday.com/business/article_b0c5044b-c54d-5a84-a92a-
042b3f7ef7da.html; see also Why Does Monsanto Sue Farmers Who Save 
Seeds?, supra note 96 (“[Monsanto] currently invest[s] over $2.6 million per 
day to develop and bring new products to market.”). 
 113. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 2 (2006), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/76xx/doc7615/10-02-DrugR-D. However, there is 
research suggesting that the $800 million research and development estimate 
is too low and that the cost actually is closer to $1 billion. Cost of Drug Devel-
opment: $1 Billion, HEALTHCARE ECONOMIST (Feb. 16, 2010), 
http://healthcare-economist.com/2010/02/16/cost-of-drug-development-1-billion 
(citing Christopher Paul Adams & Van Vu Brantner, Spending on New Drug 
Development, 19 HEALTH ECON. 130,138 (2010)). 
 114. See Margaret Brennan, et. al., An Innovation Market Approach to An-
alyzing Impacts of Mergers and Acquisitions in the Plant Biotechnology Indus-
try, 8 J. AGROBIOTECH. MGMT. & ECON. 2&3, 89, 89 (2005), available at 
http://agbioforum.org/v8n23/v8n23a05-pray.pdfhttp://agbioforum.org/v8n23 
/v8n23a05-pray.htm; Natasha Singer & Duff Wilson, Drug Firms Dreaming of 
Deals, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2009, at B1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/25/business/25place.html?_r=1&ref=busines. 
 115. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., TRACKING THE 
TREND TOWARDS MARKET CONCENTRATION: THE CASE OF THE AGRICULTURAL 
INPUT 26 (2006) [hereinafter UNCTAD], available at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditccom200516_en.pdf. 
 116. Id. at 26. 
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tections ranging from refusing to allow farmers to save seeds to 
allegedly contemplating requiring farmers to purchase its new 
RR2 soybean, while discontinuing the original version of its RR 
soybean. Similarly, the pharmaceutical industry has been criti-
cized for “product hopping,” where a pharmaceutical company 
switches the formulation of its patented drug and removes the 
“old version” as soon as the generic company files its Abbrevi-
ated New Drug Application (ANDA), which forces the generic 
company to either start the regulatory procedures over or re-
frain from entering the market for that drug.117 
B. THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT 
The Hatch-Waxman Act is a viable regulatory framework 
for the agricultural industry. The similarities between the 
pharmaceutical and agriculture industries118 and the effective-
ness of the Hatch-Waxman Act in the pharmaceutical indus-
try,119 suggest that use of such a framework would be success-
ful. Specifically, Hatch-Waxman is instructive on how to 
structure regulation for the entrance of generic GMOs into the 
market while still protecting the investments companies made 
in developing the name brand GMOs. 
1. The Inner Workings of the Hatch-Waxman Act 
Pursuant to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
(FDCA), new drugs must be shown to be safe before they may 
be sold.120 Meanwhile, drug research and development is a 
risky venture because development requires much investment 
with low rates of success.121As a result, name brand drug man-
ufacturers rely on patents to recoup their investments in devel-
oping the drug. Before the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman 
Act, name brand pharmaceutical companies lobbied for a more 
                                                          
 117. Alan Devlin, Exclusionary Strategies in the Hatch-Waxman Context, 
2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 631, 657–58. 
 118. See supra notes 112–117 and accompanying text. 
 119. Aaron F. Barkoff, Patent Litigation Under a Future Biosimilars Act, 6 
SNIPPETS 1, 1 (May 2008), available at http://www.mbhb.com/resources/doc 
uments/Snippets_Vol_6_Issue_1.pdf. 
 120. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2006); FDA, A HISTORY OF THE FDA AND DRUG 
REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (n.d.), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/BuyingUsi
ngMedicineSafely/UnderstandingOver-the-CounterMedicines/ucm093550.pdf. 
 121. James J. Wheaton, Generic Competition and Pharmaceutical Innova-
tion: The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 35 
CATH. U. L. REV. 433, 449 (1986). 
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efficient approval process to receive greater benefit from their 
patents because the longer review periods reduced the effective 
length of patent protection.122 In addition, generic drug compa-
nies claimed that requiring “generic equivalents” to undergo 
the same lengthy process required of name brand manufactur-
ers “unfairly delayed drug price competition.”123 
Responding to claims from both name brand and generic 
drug manufacturers,124 Congress passed the Drug Price Com-
petition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, also known 
as the Hatch-Waxman Act.125 The Act first allowed pharmaceu-
tical companies to apply for a patent extension of up to five 
years if the patent life was less than fourteen years after FDA 
approval.126 The Act also provided for an ANDA. An ANDA is 
“abbreviated” because preclinical and clinical trials are not typ-
ically required for FDA approval of the drug.127 Instead, the ge-
neric manufacturer must only prove that the generic drug is 
bio-equivalent to the name brand one.128 
When a generic manufacturer applies for an ANDA, the 
manufacturer must certify that to the best of its knowledge it 
meets one of four paragraph certifications as related to the 
listed drug—(I) no patent exists that covers the product; (II) the 
patent has expired; (III) the generic manufacturer will not seek 
FDA approval until the patent expires; or (IV) the patent is in-
valid or will not be infringed if the generic drug company pro-
duces the drug.129 
                                                          
 122. Id. at 435. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 
Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 101, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended 21 U.S.C. § 355 
(2006)). 
 126. Wheaton, supra note 121, at 435. 
 127. Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA): Generics, FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/howdrugsare 
developedandapproved/approvalapplications/abbreviatednewdrugapplication 
andagenerics/default.htm (last updated Mar. 21, 2011). 
 128. Id. Bioequivalence means that the generic drug performs in the same 
way as the name brand drug. Id. Bioequivalence is shown by measuring the 
time it takes the generic drug to reach the blood stream. The resulting absorp-
tion rate is known as the bioavailability of the generic drug. Id. “The generic 
version must deliver the same amount of active ingredients into a patient’s 
bloodstream in the same amount of time as the innovator drug.” Id. 
 129. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act § 
101(2)(A)(vii)(I)−(IV). 
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If, however, the patent holder does not bring a lawsuit 
within forty-five days of notice, the FDA may approve the 
ANDA and/or the generic manufacturer can sue.130 In addition, 
the generic manufacturer(s) that first file(s) an application with 
a paragraph IV certification will receive 180-days of market ex-
clusivity beginning the “date of first commercial marketing.”131 
The 180-day market exclusivity period, however, may be for-
feited in various ways, including the “fail[ure] to market the 
drug within seventy-five days of approval or within thirty-
months after submission of the ANDA.”132 
2. Applying the Hatch-Waxman Act in the Agriculture Industry 
As discussed earlier in this Note, the agriculture industry 
is similar to the pharmaceutical industry in several ways, in-
cluding substantial investment costs.133 Given the high invest-
ment costs, it is important to ensure that the manufacturers of 
name brand GMOs, like Monsanto, continue to be incentivized 
to develop novel products. Therefore, patent protection is nec-
essary. The agriculture industry appears to be facing the same 
concerns the pharmaceutical industry faced prior to enactment 
of the Hatch-Waxman Act: name brand manufacturers wanted 
reduced review periods to effectively lengthen the patent peri-
od, while generic manufacturers wanted a shortened review 
process when producing a generic equivalent. However, the 
need for patent protection must be balanced against the need 
for additional competition in the form of generic GMOs. The 
Hatch-Waxman Act is instrumental in accomplishing both   
these goals. 
The Hatch-Waxman Act provides access to data, and in re-
turn the name brand company receives patent protection. The 
Act, as applied to the agriculture industry, could work much 
like it does in the pharmaceutical industry. Under the Act, 
name brand manufacturers could extend the patent life de-
pending upon the years remaining on the patent after USDA 
                                                          
 130. Id. at 614. The 180-day market exclusivity period provides that the 
FDA may not approve ANDAs for the same drug by other generic manufactur-
ers. Id. 
 131. Id. at 619. 
 132. D. Christopher Ohly, The Hatch-Waxman Act: Prescriptions for Inno-
vative and Inexpensive Medicines, SCHIFFHARDIN LLP, at 18 (Spring 2010), 
http://www.schiffhardin.com/binary/ohly-Hatch_Waxman_Prescriptions-
42010.pdf. 
 133. See supra notes 112−117 and accompanying text. 
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approval, while generic manufacturers could follow an abbrevi-
ated application process if able to show generic equivalence to 
the name brand version of the crop. 
When it comes to generic versions of genetically engineered 
crops, there are two access points from which a “generic” ver-
sion of the seed may be obtained: (1) by purchasing seed from a 
generic manufacturer or (2) reusing seed from a previously 
grown RR soybean plant.134 With respect to access point (1)—
purchasing seeds from a generic manufacturer—an act similar 
to the Hatch-Waxman Act is important in ensuring that data is 
available to produce a generic version of the RR soybean. Due 
to current regulations, a generic manufacturer will need pro-
prietary information from Monsanto to receive federal approval 
and the technical data needed to update licenses in areas like 
the European Union (EU) and China,135 where regulations tend 
to be stricter.136 If the agriculture industry adopted an act simi-
lar to the Hatch-Waxman Act, a generic manufacturer could 
develop a generic version based on the data provided in Mon-
santo’s patent and receive USDA approval through an abbrevi-
ated process. The generic manufacturer would only need to 
show that the generic RR soybean is equivalent to the name 
brand soybean.137 In addition, an act like the Hatch-Waxman 
Act would allow generic manufacturers to begin developing ge-
neric versions sooner and also receive the benefit of an exclusiv-
ity period.138 
                                                          
 134. See Parloff, supra note 2. 
 135. Frank Morris, Monsanto GMO Ignites Big Seed War, NPR (Jan. 12, 
2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=122498255. 
 136. Marsha A. Echols, Food Safety Regulation in the European Union and 
the United States: Different Cultures, Different Laws, 4 COLUM. J. OF EUR. L. 
525, 537−38 (1998) (explaining that the EU requires not only governmental 
approval (similar to the FDA and USDA in the U.S.) but also Member State 
approval of GMOs, while the U.S. requires no special approval); see Dobe & 
Sen, supra note 11, at 208 (noting that China has published comprehensive 
new laws). 
 137. The way in which equivalence between the generic product and name 
brand one is determined is outside the scope of this Note. However, equiva-
lence should be established to show that the generic GMO performs in the 
same way as the name brand one and is not a “plant pest or noxious weed”—in 
that the generic version does not violate the Plant Protection Act. 7 U.S.C.A. § 
7712(a) (West 2010). 
 138. Currently, a generic manufacturer in the agriculture industry must 
wait until the patent expires to begin producing a generic version, which can 
result in the loss of market appeal for the generic product. For example, Pio-
neer explains that areas like the EU and China require regulatory approval 
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Monsanto claims that a regulation like Hatch-Waxman Act 
is unnecessary because through access point (2)—reusing 
seeds—the farmer is able to grow the RR soybean without hav-
ing to purchase a generic version;139 therefore, a specific act fa-
cilitating approval of generic GMOs is unnecessary. While 
farmers may realize the benefit of RR soybeans by simply sav-
ings seeds, most farmers will not want to do so due as the 
“quality of its ‘germplasm,’” or the quality of the plants genetic 
material, is reduced, thus adversely affecting the crop yield.140 
Developers work to improve the germplasm of seeds through 
breeding, which can improve crop yields.141 However, when a 
farmer reuses seeds from a previously grown plant, he will not 
receive these benefits.142 It is thus in the farmer’s best interest 
not to reuse seeds, but to purchase those that continually have 
higher quality germplasm. In addition, while a farmer may be 
able to reuse his seeds and continue planting RR soybeans, he 
will be unable to “stack”143 the RR soybean with any other trait, 
such as drought resistance. The RR soybean has only one bene-
fit—herbicide resistance144—so the farmer will forego any addi-
tional benefits that could be paired with the RR trait if the 
farmer relies solely on saved seeds. 
Adopting a version of the Hatch-Waxman Act is an effec-
tive way to ensure market competition while still protecting a 
name brand company’s patent. Legislation similar to the 
Hatch-Waxman Act would allow companies like Monsanto to 
extend the length of their patent up to five additional years if 
                                                          
before genetically engineered soybeans will be imported; however, it can take 
years for a generic manufacturer to complete and submit the required data for 
approval in these countries. Comments of DuPont/Pioneer Hi-Bred Interna-
tional Regarding Agriculture and Antitrust Enforcement Issues in Our 21st 
Century, JUSTICE.GOV, at 18, http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/workshops 
/ag2010/comments/254990.pdf (last visited Aug. 28, 2011). 
 139. Parloff, supra note 2. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. A germplasm developer could use the seeds from a RR soybean 
plant when the patent is up in 2014, but DuPont claims that Monsanto is in-
centivizing germplasm developers to “drop[ ] their Roundup Ready 1 seed 
lines . . . .” Id. 
 143. “Stacking” refers to when more than one gene is inserted into a plant 
in order to obtain certain characteristics, such as weed control or insect re-
sistance. Sorting Out the Facts Behind Stacks, MONSANTO, 
http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/Pages/gene-stacks-facts.aspx#q1 (last 
visited Aug. 28, 2011). 
 144. Parloff, supra note 2. 
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the time remaining on the patent after regulatory approval is 
less than fourteen years. This ensures that the company still 
has time remaining on its patent to recoup its investment. 
Moreover, the name brand manufacturer still receives protec-
tion in the face of litigation—in cases where the manufacturer 
is contesting an application filed with a paragraph IV certifica-
tion—because the name brand manufacturer can receive one 
thirty-month stay. 
Critics of the Hatch-Waxman Act claim the Act burdens 
the judiciary with patent disputes. The 180-day market exclu-
sivity period encourages generic manufacturers to file ANDAs, 
while the thirty-month stay encourages name brand manufac-
turers to file lawsuits opposing ANDAs.145 Nonetheless, the 
changes to the Hatch-Waxman Act following the Medicare Pre-
scription Drug and Improvement Act of 2003 are helpful in lim-
iting the amount of litigation. The Medicare Prescription Drug 
and Improvement Act of 2003 amended the 180-day market ex-
clusivity period in that it may be forfeited by the generic manu-
facturer,146 thereby limiting the number of generic manufactur-
ers benefiting from the 180-day exclusivity period. On the other 
hand, those generic manufacturers that do benefit from the 
market exclusivity period must bring the product to market 
within a certain timeframe, thus promoting competition and 
reduced pricing. In addition, the Medicare Prescription Drug 
and Improvement Act of 2003 provides for only one thirty-
month stay for a name brand manufacturer, so there is less in-
centive for the manufacturer to continue filing lawsuits for the 
same product.147 One lawsuit in response to an ANDA filed will 
suffice in triggering the thirty-month stay. As a result, there is 
less incentive to bring numerous lawsuits. 
Despite these criticisms, the Hatch-Waxman Act is shown 
to be effective. The overall sale of pharmaceuticals has in-
creased, and the average price of a prescription has fallen as 
                                                          
 145. Laba Karki, Review of FDA Law Related to Pharmaceuticals: The 
Hatch-Waxman Act, Regulatory Amendments and Implications for Drug Pa-
tent Enforcement, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 602, 615 (2005). 
 146. Ohly, supra note 132, at 18. For example, a generic manufacturer will 
forfeit the 180-day market exclusivity period if it “fails to market the drug 
within 75 days of approval or within 30 months after submission of the 
ANDA.” Id. 
 147. Id. 
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more generic manufacturers enter the market.148 The Hatch-
Waxman Act is considered to have encouraged innovation while 
“facilitat[ing] the growth of a robust generic pharmaceutical 
manufacturing industry, both in the US and around the 
globe.”149 With Hatch-Waxman’s success in lowering prescrip-
tion prices through generic competition and increasing public 
access to drugs, the Act is a good foundation on which to base 
the regulation of generic GMOs. 
C. THE BIOSIMILAR ACT 
The Hatch-Waxman Act is an effective structure for setting 
up a regulation that allows for generic GMOs to enter the mar-
ket without having to go through repetitious testing—thus de-
laying market entry—while protecting companies that spent 
millions of dollars on developing the product. The recently 
passed Biosimilar Act expands on the Hatch-Waxman Act150 
and further supports that a regulatory structure like Hatch-
Waxman is appropriate for the agriculture industry and regu-
lation of generic GMOs. 
1. The Inner-Workings of the Biosimilar Act 
The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 
2009 (the Biosimilar Act) was passed in March 2010151 with the 
purpose of lowering prices via increased competition as a result 
of a more efficient FDA approval process.152 The Biosimilar Act 
regulates biologic drugs that are typically created from living 
organisms. Biologic drugs are larger and more complex than 
traditional small molecule drugs. The Hatch-Waxman Act regu-
lates the traditional—generally chemically-created small mole-
                                                          
 148. Id. at 28. 
 149. Id. at 29. 
 150. The Biosimilars Act includes features similar to the Hatch-Waxman 
Act such as abbreviated procedures for approving drugs that are “highly simi-
lar” and have “no clinically meaningful differences;” a period of exclusivity for 
the name brand manufacturer; and a market exclusivity period for the 
biosimilar product manufacturer. See JAMES N. CZABAN, KARIN A. HESSLER & 
MATTHEW J. DOWD, BNA PHARMACEUTICAL L. & INDUSTRY REP. PANACEA OR 
POISON PILL? MAKING SENSE OF THE NEW BIOSIMILARS LAW 2 (May 28, 2010), 
available at http://www.wileyrein.com/resources/documents/BNA_Czaban_ 
May2010.pdf. Since the Biosimilar Act seems to be a modified extrapolation of 
the Hatch-Waxman Act, it further suggests the success of the Hatch-Waxman 
Act and the belief that a similar approach would be beneficial with more com-
plex products. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
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cule—drugs.153 
Under the Biosimilar Act, a drug is considered a biosimilar 
of a reference product (i.e., the name brand drug) if the 
biosimilar drug is demonstrated to be “highly similar to the ref-
erence product notwithstanding minor differences in clinically 
inactive components.”154 In addition, there must be “no clinical-
ly meaningful differences between the biologic product and the 
reference product in terms of the safety, purity, and potency of 
the product.”155 A biologic product may be “interchangeable” 
with the reference product if the “biological product may be 
substituted for the reference product without the intervention 
of the health care provider who prescribed the reference prod-
uct.”156 To meet the requirements of biosimilarity, the applicant 
must submit with its application data from analytical, animal, 
and clinical studies supporting a “high similarity” and “no clini-
cally meaningful differences.”157 If a manufacturer is able to 
show that the biologic product is a biosimilar of the reference 
product, then the approval process is shortened.158 
In return for the abbreviated process, the FDA grants 
name brand manufacturers an additional period of twelve years 
of patent protection.159 During this time, a competitor is unable 
to receive approval based on data that was originally collected 
by the name brand manufacturer.160 In addition, similar to how 
the Hatch-Waxman Act grants the first filer of an ANDA a 180-
day market exclusivity period, the Biosimilar Act also provides 
for an exclusivity period.161 
                                                          
 153. Id. 
 154. 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(i)(2)(A) (West 2010). 
 155. 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(i)(2)(B) (West 2010). 
 156. 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(i)(3) (West 2010). 
 157. 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(I)(a)–(c) (West 2010). 
 158. The approval process is abbreviated because full clinical testing is not 
required. ROPES & GREY, CONGRESS AUTHORIZES ABBREVIATED REGULATORY 
PATHWAY FOR FDA APPROVAL OF BIOLOGICAL DRUGS, ROPES & GRAY (Mar. 30, 
2010), available at http://www.ropesgray.com/healthreformbiosimilars. 
 159. CZABAN, supra note 150, at 3–4. Compare to the Hatch-Waxman Act, 
which only grants a “five-year data exclusivity barrier to the submission of ab-
breviated new drug applications (ANDAs) for generic versions.” Id. at 4. 
 160. Id. at 3–4. 
 161. Id. at 4. Under the Biosimilar Act, if a previous biosimilar product is 
already determined to be interchangeable with the reference product, then the 
FDA is temporarily prevented from approving another biosimilar product. Id. 
The exclusivity period depends on various circumstances including whether 
there is patent litigation pending or concluded in addition to when the first 
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2. The Biosimilar Act and the Agriculture Industry 
GMOs and biologic drugs have various similarities includ-
ing their complexity and substantial development costs for 
name brand manufacturers. In addition, some GMOs are also 
derived from living organisms.162 Despite these similarities the 
agriculture industry should adopt an approach more similar to 
the Hatch-Waxman Act than the Biosimilar Act. 
First, the application process under the Hatch-Waxman 
Act is better suited for the agriculture industry. When an ap-
plicant submits an ANDA certifying which of paragraphs (I) 
through (IV) are true, the length of the approval process varies. 
With the Biosimilar Act, while it is assumed that fewer studies 
will be required to demonstrate a biologic drug is biosimilar to, 
or interchangeable with, the reference product, this has yet to 
be verified.163 Moreover, debates have already ensued regard-
ing the application of the Biosimilar Act.164 Potential issues are 
likely to include how similar the proposed product must be to 
the reference product, and what it means to be “highly similar” 
and to have “no clinically significant difference.” As a result, 
the entrance of generic competitors will most likely be slowed. 
With respect to the agriculture industry, a standard should be 
adopted where if an applicant is able to show equivalence165 be-
tween the generic and the name brand GMO, then additional 
studies are not required—similar to the Hatch-Waxman Act. 
Further, with the current debate surrounding the use of GMOs, 
                                                          
interchangeable product was commercialized. Id. at 4. 
 162. For example, Monsanto’s Roundup Ready soybean, which is glypho-
sate-tolerant, is derived from inserting a gene encoded from Agrobacterium 
tumefaciens CP4, a soil bacterium. GM Crop Database, CENTER FOR ENVTL. 
RISK ASSESSMENT, http://cera-gmc.org/index.php?hstIDXCode[]=8&auDate1= 
&auDate2=&action=gm_crop_ database&mode=Submit (last visited Aug. 28, 
2011). 
 163. CZABAN, supra note 150, at 3. Moreover, the requirement that an ap-
plicant provide analytical, animal, and clinical studies seems to indicate that a 
significant amount of data is required to support biosimilarity between the 
reference drug and the biologic one. The applicant filing for biosimilarity also 
has a higher burden in proving interchangeability under the Biosimilar Act 
than under the Hatch-Waxman Act because the FDA must determine that the 
risks of diminished efficacy and safety from switching to the biosimilar prod-
uct are not greater than that of the reference product if there was no switch. 
Id. 
 164. See, e.g., Biosimilars—FDA Speaks for the First Time About Challeng-
es of Biosimilars Act at DIA 2011 in Chicago, FDA LAWYERS BLOG (July 1, 
2011), http://www.fdalawyersblog.com/2011/07/biosimilars--fda-speaks-for-
fi.html. 
 165. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
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it is better to have a term more readily understandable (i.e., 
“bioequivalent” rather than “highly similar”) when determining 
whether the generic GMO should be approved. 
Second, the agriculture industry should also adopt a mar-
ket exclusivity period similar to the shorter exclusivity period 
under the Hatch-Waxman Act. The Hatch-Waxman Act pro-
vides the generic applicant with 180-days (or approximately six 
months) market exclusivity when it begins commercially mar-
keting the product.166 In comparison, the Biosimilar Act has an 
exclusivity period that varies depending upon the circumstanc-
es—ranging from twelve months to forty-two months.167 The 
agriculture industry should adopt the shorter 180-day market 
exclusivity period because it allows for more competitors to en-
ter the market sooner, thus furthering the goal of increased 
competition and decreased pricing. 
And third, the Hatch-Waxman Act is considered successful 
overall,168 while the newly passed Biosimilar Act is both com-
plex and ill-defined.169 As a result, the courts, Congress, and 
the FDA will be busy interpreting various components of the 
Act and closing any loopholes.170 Therefore, it is better to base 
legislation to be used in the agriculture industry on an act that 
has gone through numerous revisions over the past twenty-five 
years in an attempt to make improvements rather than new 
legislation subject to much reform. 
D. FILLING IN THE DETAILS 
Both the Hatch-Waxman Act and the Biosimilar Act are 
instructive on the structure of regulation the agriculture indus-
try should adopt. In addition to adopting a standard more simi-
lar to the Hatch-Waxman Act, the agriculture industry needs to 
ensure a regulatory provision for establishing that the generic 
                                                          
 166. Ohly, supra note 132, at 18. 
 167. CZABAN, supra note 150, at 4. 
 168. See supra notes 146–148 and accompanying text. But see Martha 
Rumore, The Hatch-Waxman Act—25 Years Later: Keeping the Pharmaceuti-
cal Scales Balanced, PHARMACY TIMES (Aug. 15, 2009), 
http://www.pharmacytimes.com/publications/supplement/2009/genericsupplem
ent0809/generic-hatchwaxman-0809 (explaining that while the Hatch-
Waxman Act has benefited consumers through increased entry of generic 
drugs in the market, the Act is riddled with loopholes and gives rise to various 
anticompetitive strategies). 
 169. CZABAN, supra note 150, at 1. 
 170. See id. 
10 WELTERS FINAL_JAD (DO NOT DELETE) 2/28/2012 12:38 PM 
2012] STRIKING A BALANCE 433 
GMO is truly the equivalent of the name brand version. A ge-
neric GMO must be equivalent to the name brand by perform-
ing in the same way as the name brand version and must 
maintain conformity with the Plant Protection Act—in that the 
generic GMO is not a “plant pest or noxious weed.”171 The pro-
posed revisions to the USDA regulations may be sufficient to 
ensure the equivalence of the generic GMO; however, that is 
outside the scope of this Note. Nevertheless, a procedure for de-
termining equivalence must be established. If the USDA de-
termines that simply comparing the properties of the generic 
GMO and the name brand is insufficient, it should should con-
sider adopting a more thorough approach that conducts various 
studies and includes the results in the application process. 
In addition, the USDA needs to ensure that its agents are 
strictly complying with regulations. As discussed earlier in this 
Note, cases have arisen where the agency has not complied 
with the regulations for approval of new GMOs. With the in-
troduction of generic GMOs and the magnification it will have 
on both the benefits and concerns currently surrounding the 
use of GMOs, the regulations for generic GMOs must be strictly 
followed. 
CONCLUSION 
The expiration of the patent for Monsanto’s RR soybeans in 
2014 will mark one of the first times in the agriculture industry 
that a widely used GMO will soon have a generic version avail-
able. There are advantages and disadvantages associated with 
the use of GMOs, and the availability of a generic GMO will 
magnify both the benefits and risks surrounding use as more 
people will have access to a generic GMO due to the lower 
price. 
Revised regulations are necessary to ensure a proper tran-
sition to generic GMOs and to limit the risks associated with 
GMOs. The pharmaceutical industry is instructive on how to 
handle the entrance of a generic GMO. The Hatch-Waxman Act 
is a useful foundation for encouraging generic competition 
through a more streamlined approval process, while still ensur-
ing that name brand companies are incentivized to continue 
developing innovative GMOs. The recent Biosimilar Act, which 
appears to expand on the Hatch-Waxman Act, is helpful in 
showing that the Hatch-Waxman Act is a good regulatory 
                                                          
 171. Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 7712(a) (2006). 
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framework for more complicated products as well. While both 
the Biosimilar and Hatch-Waxman Acts are good regulatory 
frameworks to facilitate of market entry by generic GMO man-
ufacturers, a strict regulatory framework is needed to ensure 
that the generic GMO is the same as its name brand counter-
part. 
 
